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UpdateLettersA minimalist approach to comparative psychology
Charlotte K. Hemelrijk1 and Johan J. Bolhuis2
1 Behavioural Ecology and Self-organisation, Theoretical Biology, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies,
University of Groningen, PO Box 11103, 9700 CC Groningen, The Netherlands
2 Behavioural Biology and Helmholtz Institute, University of Utrecht, Padualaan 8, 3584 CH Utrecht, The NetherlandsBox 1. Minimal models of social behaviour
Models of self-organization show that cognitively simple explana-
tions can be generated for several phenomena, including cultural
traditions [7] and the caching and recovery behaviour of corvids [8].
To take one example, the phenomenon that two primate opponents
groom after a fight earlier than they do otherwise has been called
‘reconciliation’ [9]. ‘Reconciliation’ occurs more frequently with
more ‘valuable’ partners and in egalitarian societies more than in
despotic ones, and is supposed to reflect memory of the fight, an
understanding of the quality of relationships and a ‘conciliatory’
tendency [9]. Yet in our model [6], the whole spectrum of these
patterns of ‘reconciliation’ also emerges, despite the lack of such
cognitive rules. They emerge from the interplay between spatial
structure and social behaviour, partly because former opponents are
automatically in closer proximity after a fight than they are
otherwise and, therefore, have more opportunities to groom each
other. Indeed, in the few empirical studies that calculated the effect
of omitting increased proximity after a fight, the conciliatory
tendency was reduced drastically (e.g. [10]).
Many other behavioural patterns that resemble empirical data
emerge in this model. For instance, the model predicted that, in
primates, fiercer aggression and a higher percentage of males in the
group should be accompanied by stronger dominance of females
relative to males. This was confirmed in subsequent analysis of
empirical data [11].Recently, two alternative approaches to comparative psy-
chology were proposed in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
[1,2]. The two approaches have in common their suggestion
that complex cognitive mechanisms consist of simpler ele-
ments that are similar for humans and other animals. We
verymuchwelcome the suggestion that researchers should
concentrate on underlying mechanisms [1] by conducting
carefully designed empirical research [2]. However, de
Waal and Ferrari’s ‘bottom-up perspective’ [1] is an at-
tempt to support the idea of cognitive continuity between
human and non-human primates based on a limited inter-
pretation of evolutionary theory, where Darwin’s idea of
common descent is all-important. Themany striking exam-
ples of cognitive discontinuity [3] are then explained by
assuming that these capacities are based on a ‘deep ho-
mology’ of ‘the basic building blocks of cognition’ (such as
homologous brain regions in birds and mammals) and that
this justifies anthropomorphism. By contrast, Shettle-
worth [2] emphasizes evolutionary convergence as an im-
portant factor. We concur with this view [3] and are
puzzled by De Waal and Ferrari’s suggestion [1] that
Bolhuis and Wynne [3] considered convergence ‘antitheti-
cal to evolutionary theory’; it is of course an integral part of
it. Shettleworth [2] argues that the bottom-up approach
reveals both similarities and differences between species,
and this is indeed shown particularly clearly in language
acquisition in humans and its animal parallels. Bolhuis
et al. [4] concluded that, in the evolution of vocal imitation,
which occurs in human speech and birdsong but is absent
in apes [3,4], both common descent (homologous brain
regions) and evolutionary convergence (similar auditory–
vocal learning in birds and humans) have a role and that,
even though songs of birds have a simple form of ‘phono-
logical syntax’, they do not reach the complexity of human
language [4]. Given that evolutionary relatedness is not a
good predictor of the occurrence of vocal imitation in
different taxa [3,4], and completely inadequate when it
comes to language [4], Bolhuis and Wynne [3] concluded
that ‘evolution cannot explain how minds work’.
Shettleworth [2] argues that animal behaviour of seem-
ingly ‘human-like’ cognitive complexity might well be more
straightforward. Here, we advocate a specific method for
this purpose: the self-organization approach (Box 1). Mod-
els of self-organization show that simple behavioural rules
can lead to complex behaviour [5,6]. Such an approach
integrates social behaviour with the effects of non-random
encounter owing to the spatial structure of a group thatCorresponding author: Hemelrijk, C.K. (c.k.hemelrijk@rug.nl); Bolhuis, J.J.
(j.j.bolhuis@uu.nl).develops as a consequence of the competitive regime. The
spatial structure causes individual differences in who
encounters whom. These differences in opportunities to
interact with certain others (e.g. of high rank) lead to
individual differences in social behavior that can easily
be mistaken for cognitive intentions [6].
In conclusion, we advocate a minimalist approach to
comparative psychology, where empirical studies of social
behaviour should, among other things, first investigate
causes and consequences of non-random proximity, before
jumping to anthropomorphic conclusions.
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Georg Northoff
Royal Ottawa Healthcare Group, Institute of Mental Health Research, University of Ottawa, Ottawa K1Z 7K4, CanadaChristoff et al. focus specifically on the subjective side of the
self and associate it with sensorimotor and homeostatic
functions [1]. This raises several issues concerning the
nature of the neuronal processes associated with self-
related processing and how to best approach the brain
and define the concept of subjectivity.
Christoff et al. argue that self-related processing
describes ‘processing requiring one to evaluate or judge
some feature in relation to one’s perceptual image or
mental concept of oneself’. Such cognitive definition of
[()TD$FIG]the self can account only for the objective self, the ‘Me’,
and neglects the subjective self, the ‘I’. The subjective self is
characterized by self-specifying processing as related to
sensorimotor and homeostatic functions, which allows for
the basic self versus non-self distinction.
What is self-related processing and how does it relate to
the brain? Most studies presuppose a rather cognitive
concept of the self when using self-reflective tasks. This
requires cognitive functions and what we have called ‘self-




teraction: Sensorimotor and homeostatic regions
MN – Sensorimotor and homeostatic regions
f Brain-related processing
sting state in the default-mode network (DMN)
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 
neural coding, subjectivity and the self.
